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THE REAL ESTATE INSTALLMENT SALE CONTRACT:
ITS DRAFTING, USE, ENFORCEMENT, AND
CONSEQUENCES
Maurice Calhey *
I. INTRODUCTION
A seller of real estate will often choose the real estate install-
ment sale contract' to measure and define his contract obligation to
his vendee and his rights and remedies if the vendee does not meet
his end of the bargain. Such a contract is normally used when the
buyer can make only a small down payment and there is substantial
risk of nonperformance. The vendor uses the contract and retains
title until a substantial part or all of the purchase price has been
paid. The contract is usually drawn with the objective that, upon
the vendee's default, the vendor should be able to reacquire all of
his precontract rights to the property with a minimum of legal for-
mality. Since the vendee's original equity under the contract may
be minimal, he does not usually have much bargaining power in the
negotiation of the agreement or its drafting. The contract itself usu-
ally limits the vendee's rights to possession of the property pending
default and the right to a conveyance of the required title when and
if he fully performs the contract.
Any other rights the defaulting vendee may have under such a
contract are usually those which the law gives him outside the terms
of the contract itself. A vendee unable to perform his contract obli-
gations usually has few resources to assist him in claiming and en-
forcing any rights he may actually have. His bargaining power
often consists merely of his possession of the property and the possi-
bility that, without some formal surrender of his rights, the existence
of the unperformed contract may appear to be a cloud on the seller's
title that will hamper future disposition of the property.
* Partner, Cathey, Goodwin, Hamilton & Moore, Attorneys, Paragould, Arkansas.
Stephen L. Hardin, an associate, assisted in research and drafting. The author also acknowl-
edges the assistance of Susan Webber, Associate Professor of Law at the University of Ar-
kansas at Little Rock School of Law, in reviewing the original draft and suggesting revisions
and additions.
1. As used in this article, such a contract is distinguished from the ordinary executory
contract for the sale of land or binder or earnest money agreement.
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Missouri property law is not unlike that of Arkansas, and the
author, as a member of the bar of both states, finds relevant Mis-
souri writings on the general area covered by this article. In the
Journal of the Missouri Bar, Professor Grant S. Nelson of the Uni-
versity of Missouri School of Law, Columbia, points out that the
installment sale contract is a desirable instrument from the stand-
point of the vendor, subject, however, to two very important qualifi-
cations: "If the contract is enforceable as written and if the title will
not be clouded. ' '2 Professor Nelson concludes that it would be pru-
dent for lawyers in that state to avoid installment sale contracts, par-
ticularly since, unlike Arkansas, there is a workable and relatively
uncomplicated nonjudicial deed of trust proceeding available for
foreclosure.3
While this writer does not entirely agree with Professor Nel-
son's conclusions, the purpose of this article is to consider whether
the use of the installment land sale contract in Arkansas is always as
desirable as it may appear, to suggest provisions which should be
contained in such a contract, and to review the possible rights and
remedies of the vendor and vendee under the contract. In this re-
view, the inconsistent attitudes of courts in dealing with these agree-
ments must be taken into account, and particular attention must be
paid to the rights of the vendee upon default.
II. THE CONTRACT 4
An installment sale contract is usually drafted by the vendor's
attorney, and the vendee or his attorney may have little input into
its content.
All persons owning an interest in the property should join in
and be bound by the contract. The spouses of individual owners
should join in the execution of the contract so that they will be
bound to convey their homestead rights and any dower or curtesy
2. Nelson, The Use ofInstallment Land Contracts in Missouri" Courting Clouds on Ti-
tes, 33 J. Mo. BAR 161 (1977). The article also refers to the following Missouri writings in
this area: Parrish, Forfeiture Provisions in Missouri Installment Land Contracts, 29 Mo. L.
REV. 222 (1964); Comment, Installment Contractsfor the Sale of Land in Missouri, 24 Mo. L.
REV. 240 (1959); Smith, Contract for Deed-Caveat!, 21 J. Mo. BAR 492 (1965).
3. His opinion is that to continue the present Missouri practice of relying upon nonju-
dicial termination of the vendee's rights under an installment sale contract is to court in-
creasing title problems.
4. In Fendler, Drafting Instrumentsfor Purchase and Conveyancing of Land, 13 ARK. L.
REV. 26 (1958), the author discusses the contents of the ordinary executory contract for the
sale of land. Some of his thoughts are repeated here insofar as they are pertinent to
installment sales.
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rights involved, either choate or inchoate.5 The vendee's spouse is
not a necessary party to the contract unless his or her personal net
worth lends something to the financial responsibility of the vendee
or unless the property is to be purchased as an estate by the entirety.
When the property contracted to be sold is subject to an ex-
isting mortgage lien, there are various choices available to the par-
ties. The parties may choose to say nothing about the mortgage lien.
In this case, when the vendee completes his payments and is entitled
to a warranty deed conveying the property free from all liens and
encumbrances, it is the legal responsibility of the vendor to dis-
charge this lien. If the vendor does this, all is well. However, the
vendor may be unable to discharge the mortgage indebtedness at the
time the required deed is to be executed and delivered. The existing
mortgage may limit or preclude payment in advance of maturity, or
the vendor may simply not have enough money with which to pay
the amount required to procure release of the existing lien.
To avoid this unhappy situation, a number of alternatives
should be considered when the sale contract is drafted. The mortga-
gee can be consulted, .can be made a party to the contract, and can
agree not to make any additional advancements under the existing
security instrument, and the contract can set forth the terms upon
which the lien of the mortgage is to be released as to the property
covered by the contract.
The contract can require the vendee to make the vendor's mort-
gage loan payments directly to the mortgagee and to be given credit
for such payments as part of his purchase money obligation. The
contract should specify how the vendor is to be notified as such pay-
ments are made. If the purchase money obligation under the con-
tract will not discharge the existing mortgage according to its
scheduled maturity and if the mortgage contains no valid due-on-
sale provision, the contract can provide for a conveyance of the
property to the vendee when the existing mortgage indebtedness is
no greater than the amount due under the contract, with the vendee
at that time to receive his deed under the contract and to assume the
remaining mortgage obligation. While this will not release the ven-
dor from his personal liability with respect to the mortgage indebt-
edness, the vendor should be protected from loss with respect to the
5. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 61-208 (Cum. Supp. 1981), would preserve the statutory rights
of both spouses in the property unless each joins in the final conveyance to the vendee.
Hence, one spouse should be contractually obligated to join the other when the property is
conveyed.
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assumed indebtedness if the vendee has achieved a sufficient equity
in the property purchased.
Another plan is for the payments under the contract to be made
to an escrow agent who will make the mortgage payments to the
holder of the existing mortgage, with any remainder to be turned
over to the vendor. While this provision will not take care of the
obligation of the mortgagor to insure or to pay taxes, those are usu-
ally obligations which are assumed by the vendee under the contract
and may be taken care of by requiring additional payments for this
purpose to the escrow agent or evidence that the vendee has paid
taxes or insurance with his own funds.
Unless the vendor-mortgagor is of unquestionable solvency,6
the existing mortgage should be taken into account, and counsel for
the vendee can appropriately insist on provisions which will protect
his client's interest when the client becomes entitled to conveyance
of the property under the contract.
The property description should be that which is contemplated
for use when the purchase price is paid in full. It should take into
account any excepted mineral interests, easements of record, the ac-
cepted boundary lines, and easements with respect to any visible
improvements. By setting forth the exceptions or easements follow-
ing the description it will not be necessary to refer to these in detail
in other contract provisions.
The contract should carefully spell out the obligations of the
parties with respect to taxes and how the vendor is to be informed
that the taxes have been paid. If the mortgage requires tax and in-
surance payments to be paid into escrow, this should be included in
the contract.7
The improvements are often a substantial part of the property
involved. The extent to which they should be insured8 and the iden-
6. The vendee will not always be dealing with his original vendor when the contract is
finally performed. The original vendor may die, and while his heirs may take the property
subject to the vendee's contract rights, their responsibility may be less than that of the party
with whom the vendee originally dealt.
7. In the absence of an agreement to the contrary, the vendee has the obligation to pay
taxes coming due on or after the contract date, although they may be based upon a lien
created in a year when he had no interest in the property. Subsequent taxes should also be
paid by the vendee. See Booth v. Mason, 241 Ark. 144, 406 S.W.2d 715 (1966); ARK. STAT.
ANN. § 50-401 (1971).
8. In many contract situations the continuance of the improvements in at least their
contract date status is regarded as essential to the protection of the vendor's security interest
in the property sold. The vendor may require insurance coverage against loss or damage at
least to the extent of the balance due under the contract. If the insurance coverage is re-
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tity of the party who is to bear the risk of damage by fire or similar
hazard (1) between the date of the contract and delivery of posses-
sion and (2) thereafter, until the execution and delivery of the final
conveyance of the property are subjects which may appropriately be
included in the contract.
The writer has assumed that once possession is delivered to the
vendee, the risk of loss by fire and similar casualty is that of the
vendee. This is probably so, but Arkansas law is not so clear as to
eliminate the need for specific provisions in the installment sale con-
tract. While not many controversies have arisen in Arkansas in this
area, most can be avoided by appropriate contract provisions and
adherence to them.
Between the date of the contract and the delivery of possession,
the risk of loss should be that of the vendor, but this responsibility
may be limited to the amount of the vendor's existing insurance, the
obligation to continue it until delivery of possession, and a require-
ment that he apply any insurance proceeds collected to the restora-
tion of the insured improvements.9
Between the date of the delivery of possession and the final
conveyance, the risk of loss should be that of the vendee, and the
contract may require him to carry insurance, with the vendee being
a payee of the insurance proceeds as his interest may appear and
with either the policy or a certificate of insurance being furnished to
the vendor, including a mortgage clause or loss payable clause in his
favor.1°
The vendor frequently contracts to furnish an abstract reflect-
ing a certain type of title when the vendee completes the payment of
the purchase price as provided by the contract. From the vendor's
standpoint, it appears desirable to postpone the abstract or other ti-
tle expense until the vendor has actually received the purchase price
quired to be the insurable value of the improvements, there is a greater likelihood that the
insurance proceeds will be sufficient to repair the damage. Otherwise, the damage may not
be restored, and the vendor may be compelled to accept payment of his debt through insur-
ance proceeds at a time when, for tax reasons, he would prefer not to do so.
9. The author has on occasion provided that the insurance need not exceed the balance
due under the contract. This assumes that the insurance company will issue coverage for the
smaller amount and pay the entire proceeds of the loss to the contract vendor. Neither
assumption may be correct. If continued existence of the improvements is not really essen-
tial to the vendor's protection, the better practice might be to leave out the requirement of
insurance altogether.
10. Without a contract provision to that effect, the vendor is liable for waste committed
by him or for which he may be responsible. He is deemed to have a trust relationship to his
vendee while in possession. See Newman v. Mountain Park Land Co., 85 Ark. 208, 107
S.W. 391 (1908); 77 AM. JUR. 2D Vendor and Purchaser §§ 363-367 (1975).
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contemplated by the contract. This is not always the better choice.
If there is to be any dispute about the sufficiency of the title as sub-
mitted, it should occur at the time of the execution of the contract of.
sale rather than later, when substantial equities may have
intervened.
The vendor, or those who may have succeeded to his interest in
the contract, will be required to convey the property to the vendee
by an appropriate deed upon completion of the vendee's contract
obligations. When the deed is not executed as of the contract date it
should limit the warranty obligations of the vendor by excluding
matters referred to or excepted in the description of the property
and matters arising from and after the contract date by the act, ne-
glect, or default of the vendee or those succeeding to his interest.
When the vendor is advanced in years or the contract is of long
duration, deposit of the deed in escrow is desirable.
The vendor often wants a clause in the contract prohibiting the
assignment of the vendee's interest without his consent." An un-
qualified prohibition against assignment is usually invalid, but such
a provision is usually appropriate to protect the vendor although, to
protect the vendee, the language could appropriately provide that
such consent shall not be unreasonably withheld if the vendor has
advance notice of it.' 2
The contract should provide that any assignment must be in
writing with a copy delivered to the vendor, so that the vendor will
know, when he has received final payment, that the assignee of the
contract has, in fact, been granted all the rights of the original ven-
dee. The language prohibiting or restricting assignment should ex-
tend not only to absolute assignments but also to assignments by
way of pledge, mortgage, or other device and may include a provi-
sion defining the vendor's rights in the event of an execution sale
11. E.g., Sproul v. Miles, 82 Ark. 455, 102 S.W. 204 (1907); Annot., 138 A.L.R. 205, 211
(1941) (stating that the majority of the cases take the view that even if the assignment of the
contract is made in violation or disregard of a provision prohibiting the vendee from as-
signing it, this does not preclude the assignee from maintaining a suit to compel specific
performance if his assignor could have done so in the absence of the assignment); see Weis
v. Meyer, 1 S.W. 679 (Ark. 1886); American Land Co. v. Grady, 33 Ark. 550 (1878); 77 AM.
JUR. 2D Vendor and Purchaser §§ 399-402 (1975).
12. Cf. Warmack v. Merchant's Nat'l Bank, 272 Ark. 166, 612 S.W.2d 733 (1981) (land-
lord cannot unreasonably withhold consent to a sublease); Tucker v. Pulaski Fed. Say. &
Loan Ass'n, 252 Ark. 849, 481 S.W.2d 725 (1972) (there must be legitimate grounds for the
mortgagee to withhold consent to the conveyance of mortgaged property). The vendor,
however, is entitled to know of any proposed assignment. This right, the author believes,
would be held enforceable even though the vendor might be required to consent to the
assignment (without release of the original vendor) if he were made aware of it.
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against the vendee's interest. Particularly in connection with the
matter of assignment of or levy upon the vendee's interest, the con-
tract should contain a provision concerning what remedies the ven-
dor may be given in the event of a prohibited assignment. These
remedies may consist of forfeiture of the vendee's rights, rescission
of the contract by the vendor, or a right of acceleration with regard
to all remaining payments due under the contract.' 3 The forfeiture
clause may not always be enforceable, however, and rescission
would require the vendor to repay the consideration paid by the
vendee plus interest but less the rental value of the property prior to
rescission. Therefore, the acceleration of the remaining payments
would appear to be the most feasible remedy which the courts
would enforce in the event of an impermissible assignment or invol-
untary appropriation of the vendee's rights under the contract.
The author regards it desirable from the standpoint of both
vendor and vendee for the contract to contain a provision whereby
the vendor executes a warranty deed, furnishes the required ab-
stract, and takes a purchase money mortgage or deed of trust to se-
cure the balance due after the vendee has paid a specified part of the
contract price. This is advantageous to the vendee, who then has
legal title to the property, and may more readily sell or mortgage it
subject to the rights of the vendor as the first lienholder. It may also
benefit the vendor because he may more easily borrow against his
note and deed of trust than against an unperformed contract. The
unperformed contract would, of course, obligate an assignee of the
vendor's interest to furnish the required conveyance of title upon
payment, which may not be possible unless the vendor has depos-
ited with his secured creditor or an escrow agent the warranty deed
required by the contract.
The author regards it as advantageous for the vendor to require
a promissory note to evidence the installment obligations of the ven-
dee under the contract,'4 with this note to contain the permissible
provisions for attorneys' fees in the event of default.
The contract should provide that any prior indulgence with re-
gard to accepting late payments or delayed performance under the
contract shall not be treated as a precedent with respect to any sub-
sequent default on the part of the vendee.'5 It may state that time is
13. There may be serious questions about whether an acceleration can be based only on
the fact of the assignment without a showing of prejudice to the vendor or some other viola-
tion. See Tucker v. Pulaski Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 252 Ark. 849, 481 S.W.2d 725 (1972).
14. See 77 AM. JuR. 2D Vendor and Purchaser §§ 477-478 (1975).
15. Recent Decisions, 18 ARK. L. REv. 175 (1964) discusses the eagerness of the courts
1982] 235
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of the essence with regard to the performance of all obligations of
both parties under the contract. If the vendee has paid for the prop-
erty as provided by the contract, there is no logical reason why the
vendor should not perform his obligations promptly by executing
the required deed. With regard to payments, the vendor is entitled
to expect and receive prompt payment and prompt performance of
the vendee's other obligations. The "time is of the essence" provi-
sions in the contract merely accentuate the intent of the parties that
both parties should perform their respective obligations promptly
and reflect the hope that the courts will enforce those contractual
covenants.
In some cases, the vendor may deposit with an escrow agent the
executed warranty deed, dated as of the date of the contract, to be
delivered upon full payment of the purchase price. The escrow
agent normally will not want to assume any responsibility for the
enforcement of the contract. When such an escrow agent is used,
the contract or the separate escrow agreement should provide that
within a prescribed number of days after the due date of an unpaid
installment the vendor may, without notice to the vendee, pick up
the instruments deposited in escrow, and the escrow agent shall then
be under no further responsibility with respect to the escrow. In the
absence of such a provision, the escrow agent may be involved in an
election of remedies procedure which is not within the scope of its
duties or willingness to act.
The contract will normally provide for the options available to
the vendor in the event of default. The author suggests the
following:
Should the vendee default with respect to any of the payments of
principal or interest as herein provided, or otherwise violate or be
in default with respect to the vendee's obligations hereunder, the
vendor may, at vendor's option, cancel and terminate this con-
tract, in which event the vendor shall be entitled to immediate
possession of said premises and retain all sums heretofore paid as
rent for the use and possession of said premises prior to default
and as liquidated damages for the vendee's breach of the con-
tract, with the vendor to return to the vendee any promissory
note given in connection with this contract, with any unpaid bal-
ance marked "cancelled" by reason of the termination of the con-
tract, or the vendor may declare the entire indebtedness due and
to avoid the consequences of forfeiture clauses in contracts. The suggested provision is in-
tended to make it less likely that the vendor will be decreed to have waived something he
did not intend to waive. What the courts will do with such a provision is another matter.
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payable at once, sue therefor in accordance with the terms under
the note and foreclose this contract of sale as to the equitable
interest of the vendee hereunder.
The author suggests a separability clause declaring that if any
portion of the contract regarding the rights of the vendor be held
void or unenforceable, the vendor may nevertheless enforce the re-
maining provisions.
It is to the advantage of the vendor that there be no acknowl-
edgment of the instrument, which will preclude it from being re-
corded. If recorded, the contract may create a cloud on the record
title although the vendee may have long since departed and re-
turned possession of the premises to his vendor. As long as the ven-
dee is in possession of the premises, that possession is constructive
notice of his rights or that such rights may exist. In the usual ven-
dor-vendee situation under a long-term installment contract, there
appears to be no great need for the contract to be recorded if the
premises are sold to and are actually occupied by the vendee.
Recording is certainly not desirable when the vendor expects to
effectively enforce the summary remedies which his contract calls
for upon default by his vendee. Some forms actually prohibit the
vendee from recording his contract until all of his payments have
been made and all of his obligations have been performed. 6 The
writer dislikes such a provision and doubts that the courts would
enforce it if the instrument were otherwise entitled to record. It
seems unduly harsh to impair a vendee's rights if he has actually
acquired a substantial equity in the property and may have tempo-
rarily vacated it, thus depriving him of the benefits accruing from
any constructive knowledge by a third party of his equity. However,
the same result may follow if the original contract simply is not ac-
knowledged, even though it contains no specific provision with re-
gard to the contract's being recorded.
The contract provisions may vary according to the specific
problems involved. When farm property is involved, the author be-
lieves it desirable that the maturity of all payments be fixed whereby
a debt will not come due after a crop has been planted, so that there
will be no problems with respect to growing crops or unplanted
ground. Many of the problems with respect to tenancies from year
to year and a tenant holder under an oral lease of farm lands 7 can
16. 16 AM. JUR. 2D Legal Forms § 219.655 (1973), contains such a form.
17. Prior to 1981, a farm tenant holding under an oral one-year agreement was not
entitled to notice of the landlord's decision not to extend the lease for another year. This
19821
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be alleviated if the maturity of each installment is fixed early
enough in the calendar year so that the vendor retaking possession
can give notice to the vendee's tenant of his intention to terminate
any existing tenancy prior to the June 30th deadline otherwise appli-
cable. While the rights of the vendor under the contract may be
superior to those of the tenant, the selection of an appropriate due
date for payments may avoid undue and extended unsatisfactory re-
lationships between the vendor and the vendee's tenants.' 8
The use of a good office form or a good form book will be help-
ful to the draftsman of the installment sale contract. The draftsman
must, however, be aware that many of the fact situations presented
do not come within the confines of a form contract. The factual
situation should be carefully analyzed before the language of a pre-
vious contract is routinely used, and the contract should be adapted
to the facts and apparent equities of the particular case.
The vendor should be alerted to the fact that not all of the lan-
guage in his favor which has been inserted in the contract may be
enforceable in the courts. This is particularly true if the vendor does
not, after the contract's execution, insist upon strict observance by
the vendee of all the vendee's contractual obligations. Without such
a warning, the draftsman may find himself subject to criticism by his
client-and possibly to a malpractice claim-when the vendor finds
out that not all of the remedies specified in the contract are actually
available to him and that, at least in Arkansas, there are uncharted
areas concerning what the vendor can or cannot do in the event of
his vendee's default.
III. RIGHTS AND REMEDIES UNDER THE CONTRACT
A. The Rights
Arkansas courts have generally held that both the rights of the
vendor' 9 and those of the vendee 0 are assignable and that this is a
rule was modified by ARK. STAT. ANN. § 50-531 (Cum. Supp. 1981) which requires, in the
case of oral agreements, the same notice not to renew or extend as was previously applicable
to tenancies from year to year.
18. See Wallin v. Donnahoe, 175 Ark. 791, 300 S.W. 428 (1927). If the unpaid vendor
exercises his summary remedies involving his vendee prior to June 30th of any year, he may
nevertheless find it desirable to recognize the tenant's rights for the remainder of the calen-
dar year, particularly when a crop has already been started. He can avoid the effect of a
possible year-to-year tenancy claim or an oral tenancy for the next year if the summary
remedies can be enforced prior to June 30th and notice of an intention not to rent beyond
the current year is given before June 30th.
19. Lancaster v. Robinson, 221 Ark. 767, 256 S.W.2d 330 (1953).
20. Corcorren v. Sharum, 141 Ark. 572, 217 S.W. 803 (1920).
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statutory right.2 The status of the vendor of real estate has been
described as that of a constructive trustee for the purchaser, with the
vendor holding the naked legal title which he or his heirs must con-
vey to the purchaser upon payment of the purchase price.22
If the vendor's spouse has not joined in the contract and refuses
to release dower or curtesy rights to the vendee, the vendee, in seek-
ing specific performance of the contract, has the right to have the
purchase price abated by the value of the dower or curtesy rights,
but with the abatement to be restored as a part of the purchase price
if the vendor is alive seven years after his deed to the vendee is
recorded.23
If a vendee dies while in possession of the land under a contract
of purchase and has paid a portion of the purchase money, his or
her spouse is entitled to dower or curtesy therein, 24 but dower and
curtesy rights are subordinate to the lien or claim of the vendor for
his unpaid purchase price.25
If the property in question has been occupied by the deceased
vendee as a homestead, the widow or widower and minor children
would also take homestead rights therein, but subject to the superior
equities of the vendor with respect to his unpaid purchase price.26
If, as the earlier cases state, the vendee acquires an equitable
estate in the lands by reason of his contract of purchase, he should
be able to mortgage his interest therein and create a valid lien in
favor of his mortgagee to the extent of his equitable interest. In
Harris v. McCann,27 decided in 1959, the Arkansas Supreme Court
held that when the contract purchaser had possession of the prop-
erty and had paid part of the purchase price, he had an equitable
interest which he had a right to mortgage.28
21. Id; ARK. STAT. ANN. § 68-801 (1979).
22. McKim v. McLiney, 250 Ark. 423, 465 S.W.2d 911 (1971).
23. Box v. Dudeck, 265 Ark. 165, 578 S.W.2d 567 (1979). A spouse's inchoate right of
dower or curtesy is barred under ARK. STAT. ANN. § 61-226 (Cum. Supp. 1981) when the
conveyance by the husband or wife has been made and recorded for a period of seven years
or more. The court's opinion avoids the issue whether the values determined by the court
were precise with respect to the present value of the wife's right of inchoate dower, pointing
out that it was the affirmative duty of the appellants to show that the value determined by
the court was erroneous, which the appellant had failed to do.
24. Spaulding v. Haley, 101 Ark. 296, 142 S.W. 172 (1911); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 61-201,
-206, -207 (Cum. Supp. 1981).
25. Corcorren v. Sharum, 141 Ark. 572, 217 S.W. 803 (1920).
26. Spaulding v. Haley, 101 Ark. 296, 142 S.W. 172 (1911).
27. 229 Ark. 972, 319 S.W.2d 832 (1959).
28. 55 AM. JUR. 2D Mortgages § 111 (1971) (the courts regard as mortgagable interests
both the interest of the vendor of land, while the contract for sale remains executory and no
1982]
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A 1979 decision of the Supreme Court of Arkansas, Arkansas
Supply, Inc. v. Young,29 appears to be inconsistent both with this
decision of twenty years earlier and the general law on the question
of whether the interest of the contract purchaser is mortgagable.
Wright, the contract purchaser, had contracted to buy land for a
total purchase price of $15,000, of which only $150 was paid to the
vendor. Wright procured credit from Arkansas Supply, made im-
provements on the premises, and gave Arkansas Supply a mortgage
on his interest in the contract. Upon the failure of the vendee to pay
the required purchase obligation, the vendor gave notice to the ven-
dee of his intention to cancel the contract. The vendor retrieved the
deed to the vendee which had been deposited with a bank in escrow
pending payment of the full purchase price. Without any recogni-
tion of the rights of Arkansas Supply as a mortgagee of the interest
of the vendee, Young paid Wright $3,000 for the relinquishment of
his interest in the contract and paid the vendor $15,707 for a deed to
the property.
The Arkansas Supreme Court summarily disposed of the claim
of Arkansas Supply as the mortgagee of Wright. The court held that
Wright, the mortgagor, acquired no interest in the property until the
conditions of the escrow agreement and the contract of sale had
been met. Consequently, his mortgagee took no interest even
though the escrow papers had not been picked up from the bank at
the time the Arkansas Supply mortgage was given and recorded.3 °
The Arkansas Supply decision is simply inconsistent both with
the statutory law of this state and the earlier cases. It should operate
as a warning to any creditor of a vendee who seeks to take security
by a mortgage of the vendee's interest in a partially performed con-
tract of sale. In advising a vendor of such a vendee about his rights
under the unperformed contract, the author of this article would,
however, be reluctant to advise such a vendor that he can terminate
the interest of a defaulting vendee without recognition of a recorded
mortgage covering the vendee's interest under the contract.
If the interest of the vendee under an incomplete contract of
sale is not subject to mortgage by the voluntary act of the vendee,
the question arises whether it is subject to execution issued at the
deed has passed, and the interest of the vendee under a contract to purchase). See also A.
HUGHES, ARKANSAS MORTGAGES §§ 159-160 (1930) (equitable titles may be mortgaged).
29. 265 Ark. 281, 580 S.W.2d 174 (1979). The author has reviewed the briefs in this
case and in some instances has made references to facts stated in the briefs which do not
appear to be in dispute but which are not covered in the opinion.
30. Id. at 284A, 580 S.W.2d at 175.
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instance of his judgment creditor. Despite the holding in the Arkan-
sas Supply case and its apparent implications, the author believes
that the present statutory law3 1 compels the conclusion that either
the interest of the vendee or his vendor can be reached by execution,
attachment or similar process.
A number of earlier cases state that once a vendor has entered
into a valid contract of sale, his interest in the property is no longer
subject to execution or similar process, particularly at law.32 The
rule of these earlier cases was modified in 1953 by a statute which
made such an interest subject to seizure under execution, garnish-
ment, attachment, or other process.33 It would appear that this stat-
ute makes both the interest of the vendor and that of the vendee
under a contract of sale subject to execution, attachment, and simi-
lar process, but with the sale to convey subject to the equities, rights,
and interest of other parties who might have a prior or superior in-
terest in the property. Both by case law and statute the interest of a
vendee in a land contract is subject to levy or execution.34
Following the execution of an executory land sale contract, is
the interest of either the vendor or that of the vendee subject to a
judgment lien? Concerning the interest of the contract vendor, there
is now no question but that the rights of the contract vendee are
superior to those of the judgment lien creditor whose judgment is
obtained after the execution of the land sale contract.
Concerning the interest of a contract vendee, the present stat-
ute36 makes judgments a lien on the "real estate" owned by the de-
fendant in the county where the judgment is entered and in the
31. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 30-201, -219 (1979).
32. Snow Bros. Hardware Co. v. Ellis, 180 Ark. 238, 21 S.W.2d 162 (1929); Howes v.
King, 127 Ark. 511, 192 S.W. 883 (1917); Strauss v. White, 66 Ark. 167, 51 S.W. 64 (1899);
cf. Hill v. Heard, 104 Ark. 23, 26, 148 S.W. 254, 255 (1912) (citing with approval 1 C.
POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 367 (2d ed. 1905) regarding the interest of a contract
vendee: "He may convey or incumber it, may devise it by will; on his death, intestate, it
descends to his heirs, and not to his administrator.")
33. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 30-219 (1979).
34. Evins v. Sandefur-Julian Co., 81 Ark. 70, 98 S.W. 677 (1906); ARK. STAT. ANN.
30-201, -219 (1979).
35. Pulaski Federal Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Carrigan, 243 Ark. 317, 419 S.W.2d 813
(1967). While the court's opinion speaks only of the priorities between the rights of the
judgment lien creditor and those of the contract vendee, the chancellor had held that the
judgment lien did not constitute a lien against the property covered by the contract, and that
decision was affirmed on appeal. Accord, State Bank v. Sanders, 114 Ark. 440, 170 S.W. 86
(1914); Shinn v. Taylor, 28 Ark. 523 (1873). But see 46 AM. JUR. 2D Judgments § 256 (1969)
(the interest of a vendor in lands contracted to be sold is bound by the lien of a judgment
recovered against him while the contract is unexecuted, to the extent that it is unexecuted).
36. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 29-130 (1979).
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counties where it may be filed. An early case held that the equitable
estate of a defendant in realty was bound by such a judgment lien.37
This case, the author believes, is strong authority for the proposition
that the judgment lien of a creditor extends to the equitable interest
of the contract vendee in real estate.
From the standpoint of consistency, since Arkansas law does
not make a judgment lien applicable to an interest in personalty,
and, under the doctrine of equitable conversion, the interest of the
contract vendor is treated as personalty after the execution of the
contract of sale,38 it would appear that the Arkansas courts should
hold that the lien of the judgment against the contract vendor does
not extend even to the vendor's remaining interest in the property
sold, since that interest is treated as personalty. When the vendor
has terminated 39 the interest of the vendee's contract, it would ap-
pear that the vendor again owns realty and the judgment lien would
then attach.
Usually there is not much likelihood that the vendor will be
called upon to repay to his defaulting vendee any sums paid by the
37. Cohn v. Hoffman, 50 Ark. 108, 6 S.W. 511 (1887). For the rules governing the
application of the judgment lien to the interest of the contract vendee, see Annot., 1
A.L.R.2D 727, 742 (1948) and 46 AM. JUR. 2D Judgments §§ 237-244 (1969).
38. Pulaski Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Carrigan, 243 Ark. 317, 419 S.W.2d 813 (1967).
The author agrees with the result achieved by the majority in the Carrigan case, but not with
the reasoning. Judgment liens exist only by reason of statute and, until an execution has
been issued, a judgment is not a lien against personalty. In the Carrigan case, a contract of
sale was executed on December 9, 1965, which, under many decisions of the Arkansas
courts, had the effect of converting the interest of the sellers from realty into personalty. The
judgment against the sellers was not obtained until March 23, 1966. Execution against the
interest of the vendors in their contract was not issued until sometime after May 5, 1966, by
which date a deed from the vendor (the judgment debtor) had already been delivered to the
Carrigans. By the time execution was levied, there was nothing to be levied upon, either
legal or equitable, with respect to the contracted property since the transaction had already
been closed and the full consideration paid.
The dissent observed that the bond for title, once in common use in conveyancing when
lands were sold upon credit, has fallen into disuse. The dissent pointed out that the bond for
title contains a provision whereby the vendor bargains and sells the real estate to the pur-
chaser while the vendor in a contract of sale "agrees to sell." If there ever was any distinc-
tion between the two phrases, they have long since ceased to exist in actual practice. 243
Ark. at 321-25, 419 S.W.2d at 816-18 (Fogleman, J., dissenting). In the law firm with which
the author practices, forms are used for contracts of sale which recite that the vendor "con-
tracts and sells" and the vendee "contracts and buys" the lands. Since the instrument is
designated a contract of sale, the parties to it regard it as such and act accordingly. Substitu-
tion of the word "to" for the word "and" should not reduce or enhance the vendor's forfei-
ture rights, since the courts look at the substance and not the form of a transaction.
39. Bates v. Simmons, 259 Ark. 657, 536 S.W.2d 292 (1976) is a recission case, but the
principles involved are similar to those in which the termination of a valid contract is
involved.
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vendee prior to default. The retention of such sums may be justified
either on the basis of rental for the use and possession of the con-
tracted property prior to default, or as liquidated damages, for the
breach of the vendee's contract to purchase the property and to pay
for it according to schedule.' In the absence of exceptional equities
in favor of the defaulting vendee, the vendor will probably be al-
lowed to keep any money paid by the vendee prior to default, par-
ticularly when the contract expressly provides for the retention of
such payments.
B. The Remedies Available
The remedies available should be considered in the light of the
relationships created.
Many cases have declared that the relation of vendor and pur-
chaser is essentially that of a mortgagor and mortgagee and that the
vendor has an equitable lien on the land upon the failure of the
vendee to pay the purchase price. 4' In Weaver v. Gilbert,4 2 decided
in 1949, the court pointed out that a long line of Arkansas cases had
held that the effect of the contract was to create a mortgage in favor
of the vendor in the same manner as if the vendor had conveyed the
land by an absolute deed to the vendee and taken a mortgage back
to secure the purchase price. This concept strongly suggests that the
appropriate remedy should be foreclosure of the vendee's rights in
equity.
What, however, if the unpaid vendor merely retakes possession
of the property? Is this a cancellation of the contract and termina-
tion of the vendee's rights? Early cases suggest that when the pos-
session of the land is given under an executory contract for its
purchase and the purchase money is due and unpaid, the vendor
may recover possession of the landfor the purpose of applying the
rents and profits to the payment of his debt.4 Cancellation of the
debt resulting from the contract does not extinguish the vendee's
equitable title under the contract unless done with the consent of the
40. Suter v. Mason, 147 Ark. 505, 227 S.W. 782 (1921), held that an initial payment of
$3,000.00 could validly be collected as liquidated damages for the failure of the buyer to
perform since the amount was not unreasonable nor void as a penalty, in view of the magni-
tude of the transaction and the risk of monetary depression. See Annot., 6 A.L.R.2D 1401
(1949).
41. Hogue v. Hogue, 247 Ark. 914, 448 S.W.2d 627 (1969); Brooks v. Smith, 215 Ark.
421, 220 S.W.2d 801 (1949).
42. 214 Ark. 800, 218 S.W.2d 353 (1949).
43. Cleveland v. Aldridge, 94 Ark. 51, 125 S.W. 1016 (1910); Smith v. Robinson, 13
Ark. 533 (1853).
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vendee, and a subsequent sale of the land by the vendor to a third
person does not pass complete title, but merely subrogates the new
purchaser to the rights of the original vendor as mortgagee.
44
If, following default by the vendee, the vendor seeks to retake
possession of the contracted property by legal proceedings, the suit
should indicate that he does not thereby undertake the status of the
mortgagee in possession but sues as the absolute owner following a
valid forfeiture of the vendee's interest or an accepted cancellation
of the vendee's debt for the unpaid purchase price.45
The rule of the earlier cases making the original vendor a mort-
gagee in possession and giving him no reacquired title which he can
convey in fee simple will not apply, of course, when there has been a
valid forfeiture of the vendee's contract interest which is binding
upon not only the original vendee but also the vendee's judgment
creditors and the mortgagees with respect to the contracted
property.
Contracts drawn to protect the vendor usually provide for a
forfeiture at the option of the vendor in the event of default of the
vendee. Many contracts contain such a provision. In White v.
Page46 Justice McFadden points out that an executory contract with
a forfeiture clause is valid and that the forfeiture can be exercised
pursuant to the contract without proceedings in law or equity.
There are many cases which support this conclusion.47
The author, however, is unable to accept the reasoning in White
v. Page which makes forfeiture clauses valid if they are contained in
a contract of sale but ineffective and requiring foreclosure if they are
contained in a contract which is deemed to be a title bond.
44. Robertson v. Read, 52 Ark. 381, 14 S.W. 387 (1889).
45. See supra text accompanying note 42. The same suit can, the author believes, seek
a determination through declaratory judgment that the judgment creditors and mortgagees
of the vendee, if there are any, have no interest in the property. Without such a full determi-
nation, the author thinks that there will still be the possibility that the vendor has acquired
something less than a fee simple title even though he may have recovered possession follow-
ing default. If the interest of the vendee is viewed merely as a contingent interest or an
expectancy which has not been realized, the judgment creditors and the mortgagees of the
defaulting vendee may have nothing against which to enforce their judgment lien or their
mortgage upon what has, in many cases, been recognized as the equitable estate of the con-
tract vendee.
46. 216 Ark. 632, 226 S.W.2d 973 (1950).
47. E.g., Wade v. Texarkana Building & Loan Ass'n, 150 Ark. 99, 233 S.W. 937 (1921);
Three States Lumber Co. v. Bowen, 95 Ark. 529, 129 S.W. 799 (1910); Friar v. Baldridge, 91
Ark. 133, 120 S.W. 989 (1909); Souter v. Witt, 87 Ark. 593, 113 S.W. 800 (1908); Ish v.
McRae, 48 Ark. 413, 3 S.W. 440 (1887).
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As early as 188448 the Arkansas Supreme Court said,
A title bond, although it has become a common mode of making
a equitable conveyance [sic], is in fact but an executory contract
in writing for the sale of real estate, to be afterwards consum-
mated by a further action when the conditions may be complied
with .. .
And further:
In every respect a title bond is but an agreement to convey, from
which a court of equity creates an equitable estate in the vendee,
holding the vendor as his trustee for the land and the purchaser
as the vendor's trustee for the money .... 50
The cases cited in White v. Page which are treated as bond for
title cases' are not substantially different from those cited in the
same opinion which are treated as contract of sale cases,52 in which
a forfeiture may be enforced unless waived by action of the
parties.5 3
If the vendee defaults and the land is worth more than the un-
paid contract obligations, the vendor will usually want to avail him-
self of the forfeiture provisions in his contract by summary action.
The safest procedure, from the vendor's standpoint, would be to
procure a written release by way of quitclaim deed or similar instru-
ment evidencing the fact that neither the vendee, his judgment lien
creditors, his mortgagees, nor his assigns claim any interest in the
contracted property. Such an instrument cannot always be ob-
tained. Without such a written release, and absent judicial foreclo-
sure or appropriate declaratory judgment procedure, the vendor
undertaking to resell the property may find that he has something
less than a marketable title acceptable to a new vendee.
If the vendor merely wants to get his money out of the property,
his most complete remedy would be by foreclosure in equity. There,
the vendor would get the first lien on the proceeds of the sale, and
the claim to any equitable interest on the part of the vendee, his
judgment creditors, or his assignees could be disposed of if they
were made parties to the suit. The objection to the procedure is that
48. Atkinson v. Hudson, 44 Ark. 192 (1884).
49. Id. at 196.
50. Id at 197.
51. 216 Ark. 632, 636, 226 S.W.2d 973, 975 (1950).
52. Id at 637, 226 S.W.2d at 975.
53. This subject is discussed in Recent Decisions, 18 ARK. L. REv. 175 (1964); Recent
Decisions, 21 ARK. L. REV. 139 (1967); and Note, 24 ARK. L. REV. 578 (1971).
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it costs money, and the vendor may be more interested in reacquir-
ing his property than in procuring the payment for it according to
the original contract. This may be true even when the use of a note
will permit him to recover some, if not all, of his attorneys' fees
incurred in connection with a foreclosure.
The vendor's choice is between a remedy which may be inex-
pensive and apparently effective but which may leave some clouds
on the title, and a more expensive one which may leave the vendor
with a marketable title.
C. Effects of Bankruptcy
The bankruptcy of either the vendor or the vendee may bring
into play different rights and remedies from those otherwise avail-
able to the parties. If the vendee becomes a bankrupt and the
trustee in bankruptcy (or the debtor in possession) should deter-
mine, with court approval, that the vendee has no equity in the
property worth protecting, the executory obligations of the vendee
can be cancelled and the property returned to the vendor free from
any obligation to make further payments and free from any claim of
the vendee.
If the bankruptcy court determines the equity of the contract
vendee to be of value either to him or the bankrupt's estate, the
trustee (including the debtor in possession) can accept the remaining
obligations of the sale contract. If this is done, the trustee or the
debtor in possession is required to cure any existing default or fur-
nish adequate assurance that such default will be cured promptly
and compensate or provide assurance that parties other than the
debtor will be compensated for any actual loss resulting from such
default. Also, the vendor is entitled to adequate assurance of future
performance by the vendee under the contract. One option not
available to the vendor in the event of the bankruptcy of his vendee
is that he may not accelerate the indebtedness due from the bank-
rupt vendee merely by reason of the bankruptcy.54 Just what these
requirements mean in actual practice will depend largely upon the
attitude of the bankruptcy judge regarding the protection to be af-
forded the vendor upon his vendee's bankruptcy.
A purchaser in possession is entitled to retain his possession for
as long as he performs his obligations under the contract, notwith-
54. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(b)(2) (Supp. IV 1980), which precludes such an acceleration
even though the contract may provide for it.
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standing the bankruptcy of the vendor.55 If the vendor becomes a
bankrupt, the obligations owed to him by the vendee are a bank-
ruptcy asset which can be disposed of with the approval of the bank-
ruptcyjudge, 56 and this disposition can be made free of any rights of
dower or curtesy, vested or contingent, which might otherwise exist
in favor of the bankrupt's spouse. The trustee can also assign the
debtor's interest in the contract and thus relieve the bankrupt or the
estate from any liability for defaults occurring after the
assignment. 5"
If the vendor is permitted to retain his rights under the contract,
either as a part of his exemption or as an asset which the bankruptcy
court sees fit to return to him, it appears that the dower or curtesy
rights of the spouse remain and must be relinquished in the final
conveyance pursuant to the contract.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Arkansas court has not been consistent in dealing with
either the nature of these contracts, the statutes which cover them or
the rights of the contracting parties or those claiming under them.
Its reasoning in supporting or rejecting a sometimes harsh and often
inequitable result is not new to the Arkansas court or to these times.
An ancient but respected authority often found similar problems in
other jurisdictions in the contest between the literal language of the
contract and an equitable result.58 The Arkansas court has some-
times avoided a forfeiture by finding waivers to exist on rather in-
substantial grounds and certainly contrary to the intention of the
unpaid vendor.59
Since the remedies of an unpaid vendor are not covered by stat-
ute, but entirely by equitable principles, the author believes that the
best rule would be one suggested by the Oregon Supreme Court in
1922, in which the following language was used:
This case, therefore, presents a controversy not affected by stat-
ute, but is one that is controlled entirely by equitable principles.
Under those principles as recognized and adopted by the deci-
sions of the courts of this and other states where a contract for the
sale of realty is executory on both sides and the vendee has failed
55. 11 U.S.C. § 365(i)(1) & (2) (Supp. IV 1980).
56. Id at § 363.
57. Id at § 365(k).
58. 1 C. POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 455 (2d ed. 1905).
59. Berry v. Crawford, 237 Ark. 380, 373 S.W.2d 129 (1963); Recent Decisions, 18 ARK.
L. REv. 175 (1964).
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to make the payments required under the contract, the vendor, in
case such relief is not inequitable, is entitled to a decree fixing a
reasonable time in which the vendee will be required to pay the
purchase price, and upon his failure to pay such price within the
time limited, the vendee, without judicial sale, will be barred and
foreclosed of his equitable estate in said property, whereupon the
contract will be canceled and the vendee's rights thereunder will
be terminated. If, however, the vendee has paid a considerable
portion of the purchase price, or if the property has largely en-
hanced in value, or if, for any other reason, it would be inequita-
ble to grant a strict foreclosure, it is within the inherent powers of
a court of chancery, independent of statute, to decree that the
property be sold by judicial sale, and that the proceeds of such
sale, after the purchase price and the expenses of such sale have
been paid, be paid over to the vendee or to those entitled
thereto.6 °
Such a procedure would have the disadvantage of requiring the
parties to go into court to establish their rights under a partially per-
formed contract. It would eliminate the question whether there has
been a waiver of the forfeiture provisions of a contract and whether
the contract is, in legal effect, a bond for title or merely an executory
contract of sale. It would eliminate the need for and the expense of
a foreclosure sale if the vendee had, in fact, no equity in the prop-
erty to be sold either for himself or for the benefit of his judgment
creditors or his mortgagees.
It would have the advantage of recognizing that a vendee's eq-
uity in the property is measured not by what he has paid to the
vendor but by what the value of the property may be at the time of
his default.
While, as a practicing lawyer, the writer recognizes that the re-
sults will not always be uniform even in cases having similar facts,
the Oregon procedure would probably be preferable to the present
situation in which the defaulting vendee and those claiming under
him may either lose their rights because the contract was skillfully
drawn to protect the vendor or because the defaulting vendee did
not recognize the rights which he had upon default, or, if he did
recognize them, found himself unable to finance the defense of
whatever rights he had.
The present law with respect to installment sale contracts of re-
alty could be clarified by more consistent court decisions. The cases
60. Sheehan v. McKinstry, 105 Or. 473, 484-85, 210 P. 167, 171 (1922).
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should recognize on a consistent basis that the making of the con-
tract changes the vendor's interest in real estate from realty into per-
sonalty and that the vendee's interest, however slight, is an interest
in realty and should be treated as such. Next, changes of ownership
in or with respect to the vendee's interest should be fully recognized
whether accruing by way of voluntary assignment or as the result of
execution, attachment, or other process against a creditor's interest.
The validity of forfeiture provisions in the contract should depend
upon whether the vendee or the vendee's assigns have any interest
worth protecting, and not upon the form of the agreement.
The idea that a contract of sale should be treated merely as a
bond for title should be recognized as inadequate. Although the
contract may create a bond for title on the part of the vendor once
the vendee's obligations have been met, the bond for title is a part of
the contract of sale and not something different and apart from it as
used in installment sales. If equity really abhors forfeitures, as it
professes to do, it should refuse to enforce them, even when they are
contracted for, unless there is really nothing to forfeit. Installment
sale contracts with respect to real estate should be recognized by the
courts, the parties who use them, and the lawyers who draw them as
something more than a panacea for all of the vendor's headaches
when the vendee does not pay. Inflation is apt to take care of the
vendor who gets his property back, even if the vendee does not.
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